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A B S T R A C T
On 16th March 2016, the government of the United Kingdom announced the Soft Drinks Industry Levy
(SDIL), under which UK soft-drink manufacturers were to be taxed according to the volume of products
with added sugar they produced or imported. We use ‘event study’ methodology to assess the likely
financial effect of the SDIL on parts of the soft drinks industry, using stock returns of four UK-operating
soft-drink firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. We found that three of the four firms experienced
negative abnormal stock returns on the day of announcement. A cross-sectional analysis revealed that
the cumulative abnormal returns of soft drink stocks were not significantly less than that of other food
and drinks-related stocks beyond the day of the SDIL announcement. Our findings suggest that the SDIL
announcement was initially perceived as detrimental news by the market but negative stock returns
were short-lived, indicating a lack of major concerns for industry. There was limited evidence of a
negative stock market reaction to the two subsequent announcements: release of draft legislation on 5th
December 2016, and confirmation of the tax rates on 8th March 2017.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
On 16th March 2016, the UK government announced the Soft
Drinks Industry Levy (SDIL). Under the SDIL, soft drinks
manufacturers were to be taxed according to the volume of
products with added sugar they produced or imported, with
proceeds used to increase funding for initiatives in schools and
other activities to promote child health (House of Commons, 2017).
The SDIL explicitly aimed to bring about changes in the behaviour
of soft drinks companies, specifically to reformulate their products
to reduce sugar content as there were three bands – a zero rate for
those with total sugar content lower than 5 g per 100ml, one rate
for those with 5  8 g per 100ml and a higher rate for drinks with
more than 8 g per 100ml. Drinks classed as pure fruit juices, milk-
based drinks, and those containing more than 0.5 % alcohol by
volume were exempt. Companies were given two years before the
SDIL was enforced to achieve such changes. The draft of the SDIL
legislation and consultation summary were released on 5th
December 2016. The levy rates were confirmed on 8th March 2017.
The initial announcement of the SDIL came largely as a surprise
to the soft-drink industry as the UK government had previously
explicitly ruled out a sugar tax in October 2015 (The Independent,
2015). It wasmet bya negative response from industry, with claims
that it would ‘damage thousands of businesses across the entire
soft-drink supply chain’ (The Independent, 2016). A modelling
study from an economic consultancy quickly followed that
suggested that the SDIL would result in more than 4000 job
losses across the UK and, together with lower sales, this would
reduce GDP by £132 million (Oxford Economics, 2016).
To assess some of the economic effects of the SDIL, this study
examined how the stock market reacted, as a representation of
investor perceptions of the future profitability of the soft drink
firms in the UK. We conducted a study of UK-based firms with a
primary focus on soft-drink manufacturing that are quoted on the
London Stock Exchange (LSE), to investigate the extent to which
SDIL-related announcements caused the actual returns of UK soft-
drink stocks to deviate from their benchmark level. In other words,
whether these events contributed to negative excess (abnormal)
stock returns. To do this, we used an ‘event study’, an approach
which has been used to analyse market reactions to other non-
financial events, such as regulatory announcements (Larcker et al.,
2011; Zhang, 2007), outbreaks of animal disease (Jin and Kim,
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2008; Pendell and Cho, 2013) or food recalls (Pozo and Schroeder,
2016; Mazzocchi et al., 2009). We also conducted a cross-sectional
analysis to compare stock returns of soft drink firms with that of
distiller and vintners, food producers and food retailers in response
to the SDIL events. The findings of this study provide important
insights into the financial impacts of the SDIL on soft-drink firms.
2. Methods
In an efficient capital market, stock price reflects the expected
value of a firm after new information is received and processed by
market participants (Malkiel, 2003). Relying on this notion of
market efficiency, an event study allows us to examine the impact
of the SDIL announcements (i.e. event) on the value of soft-drink
firms while accounting for changes in the overall economic
environment. If these announcements are found to have generated
significant negative (positive) abnormal returns, this reflects a
view by the market of a negative (positive) impact of SDIL on
company profitability. Abnormal returns (AR) are defined as the
difference between the actual returns of a stock and its normal
returns thatwould be expected if the event did not occur. Given the
SDIL was an unexpected action by the Government for the market,
the event study can provide an accurate initial market reaction to
the news and therefore on how themarkets expected this measure
to affect the soft-drink industry.1
2.1. Events
The key event of interest is the announcement of the SDIL by the
UK government in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Spring Budget
Statement on 16th March 2016. It was announced that the Levy
would have three bands; zero at total added sugar content of less
than 5mg per 100ml; some positive levy for soft drinks over 5 g
per 100ml; and a higher levy for those with total sugar content of
more than 8 g per 100ml. With this structure, the SDIL was
designed to incentivise drink firms to reformulate their products to
include less added sugar and so move consumers toward lower
sugar alternatives. According to the Office for Budget Responsibili-
ty, the levy was expected to raise £520million in its first year. The
Chancellor did not announce the tax rates, but this revenue
estimate led to various speculations. In addition, the details of how
SDILwould be implementedwere at that point yet to be confirmed.
There were two subsequent announcements. First, the release
of draft SDIL legislation and consultation summary on 5th
December 2016. This confirmed the band system. The consultation
summary indicated that 95 % of medical and health bodies who
respondedwere supportive of the proposals, as well as 73 % of food
and beverage retailers (HM Treasury, 2016). A majority (78 %) of
manufacturers and associated trade bodies were opposed to the
levy.
Second, announcement of the SDIL rates on 8th March 2017.
These were set at £0.18 per litre for drinks with between 5 g and
7.99 g per 100ml, £0.24 per litre for those with more than 8 g per
100ml. According to the Office for Budget Responsibility revised
estimates, the tax was now expected to raise £400 million a year;
£120million less than announced in March 2016 (Financial Times,
2017).
The SDIL came into effect on 6th April 2018. As it was announced
by the UK government in advance, the implementation of SDIL on
this day was not an unexpected shock to the market and therefore
would not have caused changes in the stock market value of the
soft drink firms. This absence of stock market response is
confirmed in the supplementary analysis provided in the appendix.
In this regard, we did not include the SDIL implementation as an
event in the main analysis.
2.2. Event and estimation windows
The event window is the period over which we study the
market response to the event. Apart from the day of event, the
event window includes days after the event to avoid the potential
bias due to delays in the market reaction to the new information. It
is also commonpractise to include days before the event to account
for the possibility that the market may anticipate the event.
However, as the chances of biases from confounding events
increase with the length of event window, it is crucial that the
eventwindow is as short as possible tominimise the effect of other
events whilst being long enough to account for the possibility that
some stocks are thinly traded and to ensure the dissemination of
information regarding the event (Swaminathan and Moorman,
2009). Several newspapers reported strong opposition from the
soft drink industry on the day after the announcement. There was
also a very brief mention of legal action against the levy (Penney
et al., 2018). These industry responsesmight have an impact on the
investors’ expectation on the effect of the SDIL. We denote the day
of the event as day 0 and use Lðt1; t2Þ to represent the event
window,where t1 and t2 are the start and end dates of thewindow
respectively.
The estimation window, Tðt4; t3Þ, is the period over which we
estimate how a stock normally relates to the market, which starts
from day t4 and ends on day t3 with t4  t3  t1  t2. The
estimation window is mutually exclusive with the event window
so as to avoid possible influence from the event of interest on the
normal return parameter estimates. FollowingMacKinlay (1997), a
120 trading day estimation window is used that begins before the
event window; t3 ¼ t1   1 and t4 ¼ t1   120. Fig. 1 demon-
strates the timeline for an event study in which event window is
Lð  5;5Þ, and the corresponding estimation window is
Tð  125;   6Þ. Considering that there is limited theory pertaining
to the appropriate selection of the event window, this paper
[(Fig._1)TD$FIG]
Fig. 1. Estimation and event windows.
Note: Number of days away from the event day (t) is given in parentheses.
1 Numerous news sources, including industry news, reported the SDIL
announcement as a surprise tax. for example, Beverage Daily (2016a,b) reported
that “The announcemnet of a levy has come as a surprise to many”. Financial Times
(2016)Financial Times described the sugar tax as “something unexpected”. The
Guardian (2016) said that “Osborne stunned drinkmakers at the budget by announcing
a tax on drinks with added sugar”. See ITV News (2016); Fortune (2016) and The
Telegraph (2016) for more examples.
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examines the stock returns of UK soft drink firms over
different lengths of event window (i.e. Lð  1;1Þ, Lð  2;2Þ,
L   3;3ð Þ; Lð  4;4Þ and Lð  5;5Þ) so as to ensure the full stock
market effect of the SDIL is captured.
2.3. Abnormal stock returns
Stock investments generate capital gains from increases in
equity prices as well as dividend payments. Following Henderson
(1990), we calculated log transformed daily returns of a stock as
follow:
Rct ¼ ln½ Pct þ Dctð Þ=Pct  1 ð1Þ
Rct is the actual return of stock c at day t. Pct and Pct  1 are the price
of stock c at day t and day t -1 respectively. D ct gives the dividends
paid at day t. By multiplying with 100, Rct could also be interpreted
as percentage return of stock investment.
The impact of an event on the value of a firm is measured by the
sumof daily abnormal stocks returnswithin the eventwindow. It is
computed as follows:
ARct ¼ Rct   E½Rct ð2Þ
ARct is therefore the actual ex post return of stock c minus its
expected (normal) return at day t. To reassure our results are not
biased by spurious regressions, we conducted the Augmented
Dickey-Full test below to check if the time series of stock returns
are stationary. The presence of unit roots is rejected in all return
series (Appendix A).
A market return model is used to identify the ordinary
behaviour of the stock return and hence estimate ARct . This
method has two advantages over the constant mean return model,
another commonly used estimationmethod of normal stock return
(Henson and Mazzocchi, 2002). First, it removes the part of the
return on stocks that is related to variations in market returns,
which in turn generally leads to greater sensitivity to the effects of
specific events. Second, the market model is suggested to have
smaller variance of abnormal residuals, resulting in more reliable
statistical tests. The market return model is the following:
Rct ¼ ac þ bcRmt þ ect ð3Þ
where Rmt is the log-transformed return of a market portfolio at
day t and ect is the normally distributed residual.We estimate Eq. 2
with ordinary least squares (OLS) using a subset of the data within
the estimation window ðT Þ.
Using the beta (b^cÞ estimates from Eq. 2, the normal return of
each stock is computed as:
E½Rct ¼ a^c þ b^cRmt ð4Þ
Substituting this back into Eq. 1 we can estimate the abnormal
returns, which corresponds to the residual in Eq. 2:
ARct ¼ Rct   a^c   b^cRmt ð5Þ
The financial impact of an event on firm c is captured by its
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) within the entire event
window, which is given by:
CARc ¼
XN
t¼1
ARct ð6Þ
where N is the number of days within the event window.
A number of parametric tests, such as Patell Standardised
Residuals test (Patell, 1976), have been developed to assess the
statistical significance of AR. These testing procedures are,
however, based on the assumption that ARs are normally
distributed. Early studies showed that this assumption normally
does not hold for AR on a single day (e.g. Brown andWarner, 1985;
Bollerslev et al., 1992; Masse et al., 2000). Considering that we
were interested in whether the SDIL events caused significant
deviation of stock returns on the day of the events, we adopted
instead the nonparametric generalized rank (GRANK) test pro-
posed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2011). This test is distribution free
and thus more appropriate than parametric tests if there are non-
normalities in the distribution of AR.2 It also has better empirical
power on testing CARs over other existing tests (Kolari and
Pynnonen, 2011). All statistical analyses were done in STATA in
which the “estudy” command written by Pacicco et al. (2018) was
used to estimate the ARs, CARs and the GRANK test statistics.
2.4. Data
The UK soft drinks industry is composed of a few branded
manufacturers and some private label producers. We selected
companies which are quoted on the LSE under beverage sector.
Among the eight firms quoted, three are alcoholic beverage
manufacturers (i.e. Diageo, Distil and Stock Spirit), which are
therefore excluded from the main analysis. In March 2016, Coca
Cola business in the UK was operated by Coca Cola Enterprises
which is not considered here as it was listed on New York Stock
Exchange and thus not comparable with other firms.3 Our analysis
thus focuses on the four remaining companies operating in the UK
affected by the SDIL: A. G. Barr Plc, Britvic Plc, Fever-Tree Drinks Plc
and Nichols Plc.4 Based on Euromonitor International data (2019),
these firms comprise 15.4 % of the UK “soft-drinks” market in 2017,
which also includes other drinks, such as bottled water, juices and
ready-to-drink teas and coffees. Over 50 % of the portfolios of the
four firmswere likely to be affected by the SDIL (Table 1).While not
representative of the full soft-drink market, the analysis of these
Table 1
Approximate proportion of portfolio affected by the SDIL.
Approximate proportion of
portfolio affected by the SDIL
Sources Drinks
A. G. Barr Plc 60 % A. G. Barr Plc’s annual report in 2016 Iru-Bru, Snapple, Rubicon
Britvic Plc 66 % Britvic Plc’s annual report in 2016 Pepsi, Robinsons, Tango, 7up
Fever-Tree Drinks Plc 75 % Analysts’ estimate obtained from Reuters, 2016) Tonic Water, Lemonade
Nichols Plc 64 % British Soft Drinks Association (2015) Vimto, Sunkist
2 In unreported results, we performed skewness and kurtosis normality test and
the Shapiro-Wilk test over the estimated abnormal returns of all firms studied.Most
of them were found to be not normally distributed, suggesting that parametric
testing methods were not appropriate.
3 While Coca Cola HBC AG, a major bottler for Coca Cola, is listed on the LSE, it is
excluded as it does not operate in the UK and thereforewould not be affected by the
levy. In unreported results, we tested their stock returns using the same event study
method and found no evidence of significant deviation in their stock returns from
the normal level during the SDIL-events.
4 Nichols Plc and Fever-Tree Drinks plc are listed on Alternative Investment
Market (AIM) rather than theMainMarket of LSE. Shares on AIM tend to have a large
gap between the buying and selling price and be more thinly traded.
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four companies nonetheless provides an interesting case study to
investigate the industry effects of the government policy.
Table 2provides financial information on the four firms. Basedon
total revenue,BritvicPlc is the largestUKsoft-drinkfirmlistedon the
LSE, followed byA. G. Barr Plc. Fever-TreeDrinks Plc has experienced
the fastest growth in terms of total revenue and net income from
2015 to 2017. A. G. Barr Plc and Nichols Plc focus their business
relativelymore intheUKwith96%and81%of their revenuefromthis
market respectively. In 2018, while the UK became a relativelymore
important market for Fever-Tree Drinks Plc, where its percentage of
revenue from the UK increased by 22 % from 2015, the UK share of
Britvic Plc’s revenue decreased to 63 % from 68 % in 2015.
The Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 250 Index was used
to capture market return in the UK. This enabled us to account for
changes in the overall economic environment in the UK that affects
the stock market. It is a value-weighted share index of the 101st to
the 350th largest companies listed on the LSE. Compared to the
FTSE 100 index, consisting of the largest 100 firms listed on the LSE,
FTSE250 has less internationally focused companies which
predominately derive their income from the UK economy. It is
thus a better indicator of the UK economic performance. We used
Yahoo!Finance to obtain data on dividends and closing stock prices
of the firms as well as the market indices. We also checked the
robustness of our findings by using FTSE All Share Index as the
market return, which represents 98–99 % of UK market capital-
isation (FTSE Russell, 2019).
Fig. 2 illustrates stock prices of the four soft drink firms
available for the analysis from July 2015 to July 2018. Consistent
with its rapid increase in revenue, the market value of Fever-Tree
Drinks Plc displayed the fastest growth rate. Its stock price
increased fivefold over three years. From the descriptive assess-
ment, the SDIL-related announcements do not seem to have had a
strong effect on the trends of stock prices of UK soft-drink firms
listed on the LSE. It can also be seen that the UK stock market has
been improving since the late 2016 as suggested by the upward
trend of FTSE250 index in Fig. 3.
Similarly, Fig. 4displays limitedevidenceof astrongSDIL impacton
the daily actual return of soft drink stock. While the daily return of all
four firmsbounced aroundzero over thedata period, Fever-TreeDrinks
Plc was shown to have themost volatile stock returns. The volatility of
these firms did not show obvious changes after each SDIL event.
3. Results
This section first reports the results for the announcement of the
SDIL which was recognised as a shock to the industry. It then
discusses the findings for the two subsequent SDIL-related events.
All ARs andCARswere estimatedwith FTSE 250 as themarket index.
As robustness check, we repeated the analysis with FTSE All Share
Indexand reported theestimates in theappendixB.Wealsoused the
estimates from a longer estimationwindow250 days in appendix C.
3.1. Announcement of the SDIL - 16th march 2016
Fig. 5 shows the daily abnormal stock returns to the UK soft
drink firms over an 11-day event window, Lð  5;5Þ. Data points
labelled with markers are statistically significant at the 5 % level.
The magnitude of the market response is further illustrated in
Table 3, presenting CARs computed using different length of event
windows. With a 1-day event window, the CAR is equivalent to the
daily abnormal return on the day of announcement. It can be seen
from Fig. 5 that, on the day of announcement (day 0), most listed
UK soft drink firms experienced a significant decline in their
abnormal stock returnswith the exception of Fever-TreeDrinks Plc.
Nichols Plc is found to have faced the largest drop in stock returns
relative to its benchmark level on the day of the initial SDIL
announcement abnormal return (-0.071 in Table 3), followed by A.
G. Barr Plc (-0.028) and Britvic Plc (-0.021).
As the market response to an event may spread over time it is
important to consider abnormal returns over the entire event
window. Both A. G. Barr Plc and Britvic Plc continued to display a
statistically significant and negative abnormal return on the day
after the announcement (day 1) in Fig. 5. By day 2, the daily return
of soft-drink stocks returned to their normal level with no
statistical difference from zero. The CARs of A. G. Barr Plc and
Britvic Plc were negative in a 3-day event window with the
magnitude of 0.079 and 0.044 respectively, which decreased over
longer horizon (Table 3). Among all four firms, Nichols Plc
appeared to be most affected by the SDIL announcement as it
was the only firm recorded the statistically significant negative
CARs at a rate of 0.103 in a 9 day event window. The positive CARs
of Fever-Tree Drinks Plc over longer event windows were likely to
be due to its announcement of an 82 per cent jump in full-year
profit on 14th March 2016 (Fever-Tree Drinks Plc, 2016). The
negative CARs of the other three firms suggest that investors
reacted almost immediately to the announcement of SDIL and
regarded it negatively and also that it would have a larger impact
on Nichols Plc, followed by A. G. Barr Plc and Britvic Plc.5
Table 2
Financial information of UK soft-drink firms listed on the LSE†.
Financial year Ending date of financial year Total revenue Net Income Geographical revenue distribution
(in ‘000 GBP) (in ‘000 GBP) UK (%) non-UK (%)
A. G. Barr Plc (Ticker: BAG.L)
2015 30/01/2016 258,600 34,300 96 4
2018 26/01/2019 279,000 35,800 96 4
Britvic Plc (Ticker: BVIC.L)
2015 27/09/2015 1,300,100 103,800 68 32
2018 30/09/2018 1,503,600 117,100 63 37
Fever-Tree Drinks Plc (Ticker: FEVR.L)
2015 31/12/2015 59,253 13,331 35 65
2018 31/12/2018 237,449 61,779 57 43
Nichols Plc (Ticker: NICL.L)
2015 31/12/2015 109,279 22,233 78 22
2018 31/12/2018 142,037 25,515 81 19
Sources: Annual reports from corresponding soft-drink firms. †Examples of soft drinks produced by these companies are given in the appendix. xEstimated by analysts given
in Reuters (2016). z(British Soft Drinks Association, 2015).
5 In the appendix, weperformed a supplementary analysis of the implementation
of SDIL on 6th April 2018. As the date of implementation was announced by the
government well in advance, it is unsurprising that no significant stock market
response was found.
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3.2. Subsequent SDIL - related announcements – 5th december 2016 &
8th march 2017
Turning to the two subsequent SDIL events, Table 4 demon-
strates that none of the firms were affected negatively by these
events. The negative abnormal stock return on day 0 for the release
of consultation report events was found (but not statistically
significant different from zero) for all firms. The market reaction
remained minimal even after extending the event window except
for Britvic Plc. Its CARs were statistically significant and varied
from -0.051 to 0.069. This mixed market reaction could be due to
its announcement of 10.3 % growth in profit after tax on 30th
November 2016 (Britvic Plc, 2016) and the investment rating
downgrading by Goldman Sachs on 2nd December 2016 (Invest-
egate, 2016).
Similarly, the confirmation of SDIL rates did not appear to have a
negative impact on returns of soft drink stocks. This suggests that
this event did not reveal SDIL-related information that was
unexpected by the market. Indeed, although the tax rates were not
announced by the government on 16th March 2016, they were
speculated to be around 18p to 24p per litre based on the revenue
estimates even though this was not confirmed until 8 March 2017
(Beverage Daily, 2016a,b). One exception was the stock returns of
Nichols Plc which experienced a positive CAR for SDIL rate
confirmation on 8th March 2017. These positive stock returns
ranged from 0.036 to 0.076 depending of the length of event
window considered, suggesting the existence of confounding
events which contributed to a positive outlook of Nichols Plc
despite the SDIL event.6 The estimates in Tables 3 and 4 were
robust to the case in which the normal behaviour of soft drink
stocks was modelled with a 250-day estimation window. Overall,
the stock market did not regard subsequent SDIL announcements
as presenting risk of further harm to soft drink firms’ profitability.
[(Fig._2)TD$FIG]
Fig. 2. Prices of UK soft drink stocks listed on the LSE (in GBP), July 2015 - July 2018.
Note: Blue lines indicate the dayof SDIL announcement (16thMarch 2016). Green lines indicate the daywhen the SDIL draft legislation and consultation reportwere published
(5th December 2016). Red lines indicate the day when SDIL rates were confirmed (8th March 2017). Orange lines indicate the day when the SDIL was implemented (6th April
2018)
[(Fig._3)TD$FIG]
Fig. 3. FTSE250 Index, March 2015 - July 2018.
Note: Blue line indicates the day of SDIL announcement (16th March 2016). Green
line indicates the day when the SDIL draft legislation and consultation report were
published (5th December 2016). Red line indicates the day when SDIL rates were
confirmed (8th March 2017). Orange line indicates the day when the SDIL was
implemented (6th April 2018)
6 While Nichols Plc announced a 15.3% rise in the final dividend on 2nd March
2017 (Nichols Plc, 2017), no further news specific to Nichols Plc was found from 2nd
March 2017 to 15thMarch 2017. A further in-depth research is needed to identify the
cause of the positive CARs observed,which is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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4. Cross-sectional analysis
Since the SDIL was announced on 16th March 2016 as part of the
Budget by the Government, the negative stock market reaction
shown in Table 3 might not be unique to soft drink firms. There
could be other policies that may have a negative impact on food
and drinks related companies and hence not well captured by the
market return index. To verify, we extended the above event study
analysis to UK-operating firms listed on the LSE under the sectors
of distillers and vintners, food retailers and food producers. We
first estimated their CARs for these stocks for each SDIL event and
then pooled these estimates together with the ones given in
Tables 3 and 4 for a cross-sectional regression (MacKinlay, 1997).
The aim of this analysis is to indicate if the CARs of soft drink firms
were significantly different from that of other food and drinks
related firms.
To limit the influence from confounding events, we focused our
discussion on the ARs on the event day (Lð0;0Þ) and the CARs of a 3
day event window (Lð  1;1Þ) 7, which are given in Table 5. Most
firms did not experience a statistically significant AR on the day of
SDIL announcement except for Finsbury Food Group Plc and
Purecircle Ltd. These two firms recorded positive abnormal returns
of 0.047 and 0.066 respectively, suggesting that the investors
expected a more favourable business environment for them. The
Finsbury Food Group Plc is a speciality bakery manufacturer,
producing a wide range of cake, bread and snack products for
[(Fig._5)TD$FIG]
Fig. 5. Daily abnormal returns in response to SDIL announcement on 16th March
2016.
Note: Statistically significant abnormal returns at 5 % level are labelledwithmarkers
based on GRANK test statistics.
Table 3
CARs for the announcement of SDIL on 16th March 2016.
Event window A. G. Barr Plc Britvic Plc Fever-TreeDrinks Plc Nichols Plc
1 day (0,0)   0.028**   0.021**   0.015   0.071***
(2.206) (2.238) (0.559) (3.883)
3 days (-1,1)   0.079***   0.044*** 0.067   0.095***
(3.580) (2.685) (1.473) (2.934)
5 days (-2,2)   0.074**   0.030 0.117   0.086**
(2.534) (1.380) (1.996) (2.024)
7 days (-3,3)   0.069*   0.033 0.160**   0.104**
(1.966) (1.303) (2.288) (2.039)
9 days (-4,4)   0.051   0.030 0.179**   0.103*
(1.277) (1.039) (2.239) (1.772)
11 days (-5,5)   0.041   0.017 0.185**   0.093
(0.915) (0.516) (2.083) (1.440)
[213_TD$DIFF]Note: GRANK test statistics are given in parenthesis. ***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .1.
[(Fig._4)TD$FIG]
Fig. 4. Daily actual returns of UK soft drink stocks listed on LSE (in GBP), July 2015 - July 2018.
Note: Blue line indicates the day of SDIL announcement (16thMarch 2016). Green line indicates the daywhen the SDIL draft legislation and consultation reportwere published
(5th December 2016). Red line indicates the day when SDIL rates were confirmed (8th March 2017). Orange line indicates the day when the SDIL was implemented (6th April
2018)
7 In unreported results, we estimated the CARs for other lengths of eventwindow.
Most CARs estimates were not statistically significant based on the GRANK test
statistics. There was no clear pattern of significant CARS across firms or across
events.
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retailers and food service channels. While in principle some
substitution from soft drinks to sweet bakery products might
occur, the SDIL is unlikely the key driver behind its positive AR due
to its diverse product mix. However, the association with SDIL and
positive AR for Purecircle Ltd which is a manufacturer of artificial
sweeteners is more likely. The SDIL explicitly gave an incentive to
reformulate soft drink recipes to contain less sugar for which one
possibility is to replace caloric added sugar with low- or no-calorie
sweeteners, which would create greater demand for products
manufactured by Purecircle Ltd. In addition, Ocado Group Plc
Table 4
CARs (%) to subsequent SDIL announcements.
Event window A. G. Barr Plc Britvic Plc Fever-Tree Drinks Plc Nichols Plc
Panel A: Release of SDIL consultation report on 5th December 2016
1 day (0,0)   0.005   0.009   0.010 0.005
(0.400) (0.945) (0.552) (0.407)
3 days (-1,1)   0.002   0.027*   0.017 0.017
(0.094) (1.732) (0.508) (0.865)
5 days (-2,2)   0.029   0.051**   0.068 0.015
(0.937) (2.514) (1.580) (0.576)
7 days (-3,3)   0.036 0.062**   0.043   0.009
(0.989) (2.535) (0.831) (0.313)
9 days (-4,4)   0.025 0.060**   0.025 0.008
(0.586) (2.135) (0.427) (0.229)
11 days (-5,5)   0.003 0.069**   0.021 0.013
(0.064) (2.231) (0.324) (0.329)
Panel B: Confirmation of SDIL rates on 8th March 2017
1 day (0,0)   0.014   0.010   0.008 0.036***
(1.466) (0.760) (0.458) (3.876)
3 days (-1,1)   0.008 0.002 0.011 0.057***
(1.466) (0.760) (0.458) (3.876)
5 days (-2,2)   0.003   0.004 0.008 0.074***
(0.113) (0.144) (0.221) (3.490)
7 days (-3,3) 0.017   0.006 0.029 0.033
(0.639) (0.167) (0.638) (1.283)
9 days (-4,4) 0.044 0.002 0.016 0.048
(1.433) (0.040) (0.309) (1.639)
11 days (-5,5) 0.064 0.001 0.021 0.065*
(1.908) (0.022) (0.356) (1.968)
[213_TD$DIFF][199_TD$DIFF]Note: GRANK test statistics are given in parenthesis. ***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .1.
Table 5
ARs/ CARs of other food and drinks related firms in response to SDIL- related events.
Firms SDIL announcement on 16th March
2016
Release of consultation report on 5th December
2016
Confirmation of SDIL rates on 8th March
2017
1 day (0,0) 3 days (-1,1) 1 day (0,0) 3 days (-1,1) 1 day (0,0) 3 days (-1,1)
Distillers & Vintners
C&C Group Plc 0.002 0.026 0.011 0.025   0.006   0.003
Diageo Plc   0.003   0.016 0.001   0.007   0.001   0.003
Distil Plc 0.052 0.002 0.000 0.001   0.016 0.080
Stock Spirits Group Plc 0.016 0.003 0.008   0.013 0.017   0.020
Food producers
Associated British Foods Plc   0.002   0.008 0.001 0.020 0.003 0.019
Cranswick Plc 0.014 0.047   0.023   0.015   0.001   0.008
Devro Plc   0.001   0.023 0.036 0.128 0.020 0.002
Finsbury Food Group Plc 0.047   0.010 0.004   0.008 0.000   0.019
Glanbia Plc   0.017   0.016   0.012   0.012 0.000 0.031
Greencore Group Plc   0.002   0.011 0.007   0.020   0.010   0.014
Hilton Food Group Plc 0.007   0.010   0.006 0.035   0.004 0.029
Kerry Group Plc   0.006 0.001   0.011 0.004 0.006   0.003
Premier Foods Plc 0.004   0.021   0.001 0.007 0.002 0.019
Purecircle Ltd 0.066 0.081   0.012   0.090   0.032 0.030
Real Good Food Plc   0.002   0.011   0.001   0.084 0.000   0.014
Science In Sport Plc 0.002 0.007   0.002 0.009   0.014   0.076
Tate & Lyle Plc   0.015   0.028   0.002 0.002 0.000 0.004
Unilever Plc   0.015   0.015 0.004 0.012   0.005 0.030
Food retailers
Greggs Plc 0.010 0.011 0.007 0.016 0.005   0.004
Mccoll's Retail Group Plc 0.019 0.038 0.008 0.025 0.001 0.053
Wm Morrison Supermarkets Plc   0.006 0.000 0.012 0.016 0.003   0.073
Ocado Group Plc 0.043 0.120 0.009 0.007   0.014 0.001
J Sainsbury Plc   0.002   0.012 0.010 0.029 0.006 0.006
SSP Group Plc   0.003 0.012   0.004   0.021 0.000   0.001
Tesco Plc   0.007   0.015 0.024 0.020   0.006   0.023
Total Produce Plc   0.003 0.027   0.001   0.013   0.002   0.004
Note: Statistically significant abnormal returns at 5 % level are marked in bold based on GRANK test statistics.
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experienced a positive CARs over the 3-day event window, which
could be due to its confounding announcement of 15 % sales
growth in the first quarter of 2016 (Ocado Group Plc, 2016).
For the subsequent events, while significant ARs and CARs were
not found for most firms, Devro Plc, a sausage casting producer,
recorded a 0.128 CARs over the 3 day event window of the release
of consultation report on 5th December 2016 and Wm Morrison
Supermarket Plc faced a -0.073 CARs over the 3-day event window
of the confirmation of SDIL rates on 8th March 2017. These CARs
were likely to be driven by confounding events rather than SDIL
events as their ARs on the day of SDIL event were not statistically
significant.
To carry out the cross-sectional analysis, for each event, we
pooled the CAR estimates in Tables 3 and 5 and estimated the
following equation:
CARc ¼ aþ b1Sof tdr inksc þ b2Firmsize c þ ec
where CARc indicates the estimates of abnormal returns of each
stock c given in Table 1 and 6 and a is the constant term.
Sof tDr inksc is a dummy indicator which takes the value of 1 if the
stock belongs to soft drink sector (i.e. one of the firms listed on
Table 2) and 0 otherwise. F irmsize c is the logarithm of market
capitalisation (i.e. total value of a company) of the prior month,
obtained from the LSE database8 . For instance, for the SDIL
announcement on 16th March 2016, market capitalisation in
February 2016 was used. This variable serves as proxy variable for
firm size, which is a firm characteristic commonly used as a control
in cross-sectional analysis of stock returns (e.g. Pozo and
Schroeder, 2016; Devos et al., 2015; Lopatta and Kaspereit,
2014). In addition, it is also a potential determinant of the
reduction in food company valuation caused by an event (Salin and
Hooker, 2001).
Panel A of Table 6 reports the OLS estimates of the cross-
sectional regressions over different event windows for the
announcement of SDIL. On the event day, the ARs of soft drink
firms were found to be significantly lower than other firms at a
magnitude of 0.043. This association was no longer statistically
significant over longer horizons. Firm size was found to be
generally an important factor in explaining themagnitude of CARs.
Panel B gives the cross-sectional results for the release of SDIL
consultation report on 5th December. Column 1 shows some weak
evidence that AR of soft drink firmswas slightly lower (0.008) than
other firms on the day of the event. This association was also
observed over a 5-day event window (column 3), which was
unlikely to be driven by the SDIL event as it was not statistically
significantly different from zero when using a 3- day event
windows (columns 2). Similar negative coefficients on soft drink
firms were not observed in panel C for the confirmation of soft
drink rates on 8th March 2017. This was in line with the argument
that as the rates were largely speculated, the confirmation did not
provide new information to the investors, leading to no impacts of
the stock returns of soft-drink firms. In both panels B and C, firm
size was not found to be linked to the CARs.
5. Discussion & conclusion
Using event study method, this study investigated the effect of
SDIL-related announcements on the market value of UK soft-drink
manufacturer stocks. Our results suggest that investors signifi-
cantly lowered their valuation of these firms in response to the first
SDIL announcement on 16th March 2016, with the exception of
Fever-Tree Drinks Plc. Since Nichols Plc experienced the largest
negative abnormal stock return, one might infer that its future
profitability was perceived to be the most affected of the
manufacturers we studied. The heterogeneity of CARs across
soft-drink firms appears to be consistent with their different
geographical business concentration. Nichols Plc and A. G. Barr Plc,
which have higher share of business in the UK, experienced larger
Table 6
Cross-sectional analysis of CARs.
1 day (0,0) 3 days (-1,1) 5 day (-2,2) 7 days (-3,3) 9 day (-4,4) 11 days (-5,5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Announcement of SDIL on 16th March 2016
Soft drinks   0.043***   0.045   0.025   0.031   0.025   0.042
(0.013) (0.034) (0.043) (0.055) (0.058) (0.060)
Firm size   0.004***   0.002   0.004*   0.014**   0.016***   0.018***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
Constant 0.100*** 0.050 0.098* 0.297** 0.341*** 0.423***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.049) (0.108) (0.097) (0.152)
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30
R-squared 0.443 0.146 0.064 0.249 0.244 0.137
Panel B: Release of SDIL consultation report on 5th December 2016
Soft drinks   0.008*   0.010   0.033*   0.003   0.009 0.002
(0.004) (0.012) (0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Firm size 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001   0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.000   0.043   0.023   0.059   0.001 0.028
(0.017) (0.074) (0.086) (0.079) (0.113) (0.107)
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30
R-squared 0.053 0.024 0.083 0.019 0.005 0.001
Panel C: Confirmations of SDIL rates on 8th March 2017
Soft drinks 0.003 0.014 0.007 0.005 0.012 0.022
(0.011) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019)
Firm size 0.001   0.001   0.004   0.008   0.003   0.003
(0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant   0.014 0.031 0.095 0.184 0.086 0.087
(0.017) (0.093) (0.161) (0.213) (0.158) (0.159)
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30
R-squared 0.016 0.031 0.031 0.085 0.025 0.033
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
8 Available at https://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/historic/compa-
ny-files/company-files.htm
8 C. Law et al. / Economics and Human Biology xxx (2019) 100834
G Model
EHB 100834 No. of Pages 11
Please cite this article in press as: C. Law, et al., An analysis of the stock market reaction to the announcements of the UK Soft Drinks Industry
Levy, Econ. Hum. Biol. (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ehb.2019.100834
negative CARs. Conversely, stock returns of Fever-Tree Drinks Plc
were unaffected by the first SDIL announcement. With a smaller
share of revenue (40–50 %) generated from the UK, it is not
surprising that the market may have perceived the SDIL as a lower
threat to Fever-Tree Drinks Plc. In addition, it occupies a different
market niche as it is a manufacturer of ‘mixers’; considered a
premium product over regular soft-drinks, and thus potentially
less vulnerable to increased price through the SDIL.
Across the event windows for the SDIL announcement,
significant negative CARs were not observed for UK-operating
alcohol, food retail and food producing firms listed on the LSE. The
cross-sectional results suggested that the ARs of soft drink stocks
were 0.043 lower than that of other food and drinks related stocks
on the day of the SDIL announcement. Such difference was no
longer statistically significant for CARs estimated with longer
event windows. While these results demonstrate that the SDIL
announcement was viewed by the stock market as bad news for
the soft drink industry, it had limited impacts on other food and
drink related industries. Furthermore, themarket reactionwas less
persistent than one found in response to meat and poultry recalls
in the US by Pozo and Schroeder (2016). Their result showed that
the negative CARs across US meat industry stocks remained
statistically significant 20 trading days after recall announcements.
Table 4 showed the CARs of the UK soft drinks firms in response to
the first SDIL announcement were no longer significant after 4
trading days. There was limited evidence of significantly negative
stock market reaction both in terms of ARs and CARs to the release
of the SDIL consultation report and the confirmation of the SDIL
rates, which was largely consistent with the cross-sectional
findings.
One limitation needs to be considered. The analysis excluded
private labels or soft drink producers that were not listed on LSE,
such as Coca Cola. Considering that we only examined the stock
market returns of four UK-operating firms, the present event study
does not have sufficient statistical power to detect the presence of
non-zero abnormal stock returns across firms (MacKinlay, 1997).
Thus, while our results are empirically valid for each individual
firm, caution is required in terms of their applicability to the entire
soft drink industry.
Overall, the abnormal stock returns in response to the SDIL
news we observed were generally negative but short-lived. While
the stock market initially perceived the SDIL announcement as
detrimental to the soft-drink firms, the ‘bounce-back’ of CARs
suggests that negative financial impact might not be as
substantial as portrayed by the industry. Indeed, the share prices
of all firms studied in this paper displayed a general increasing
trend after 2016 (Fig. 1). More importantly, even though A. G. Barr
was the company that suffered the largest negative financial
shock from the SDIL announcement, its annual net income
increased from £34.4million in 2016 to £35.8million in 2018
(Table 1). More broadly, that only four companies comprising 15 %
of the market were eligible for inclusion suggests a diffused
market with most companies having wide portfolios, or more
global coverage, which may make policies such as SDIL relatively
insignificant in terms of their material effect and more significant
perhaps as rhetorical devices. In this case there needs to be more
research on the value of shock announcements and the core
drivers of impact from fiscal policy devices, especially over the
medium- to long-term.
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Appendix A
A. Augmented Dickey-Full test statistics
A. G. Barr
Plc
Britvic
Plc
Fever-Tree
Drinks Plc
Nichols
Plc
FTSE
250
Z(t)   10.45   12.01   9.11   12.17   10.83
B. CARs with FTSE All Share index and a 120-day estimation window
Event window A. G. Barr Plc Britvic Plc Fever-Tree Drinks Plc Nichols Plc
Panel A: Announcement of SDIL on 16th March 2016
1 day (0,0)   0.026**   0.018**   0.012   0.070***
(1.997) (1.824) (0.434) (3.806)
3 days (-1,1)   0.075***   0.038** 0.073   0.092***
(3.306) (2.181) (1.572) (2.843)
5 days (-2,2)   0.067**   0.019 0.129**   0.081**
(2.225) (0.824) (2.155) (1.896)
7 days (-3,3)   0.061*   0.023 0.173**   0.099**
(1.699) (0.840) (2.422) (1.941)
9 days (-4,4)   0.044   0.019 0.191**   0.097*
(1.057) (0.597) (2.352) (1.668)
11 days (-5,5)   0.037   0.012 0.191**   0.091
(0.814) (0.353) (2.101) (1.404)
Panel B: Release of SDIL consultation report on 5th December 2016
1 day (0,0)   0.006   0.009   0.012 0.004
(0.377) (0.853) (0.578) (0.399)
3 days (-1,1)   0.006   0.030   0.022 0.017
(0.209) (1.647) (0.632) (0.873)
5 days (-2,2)   0.035   0.058**   0.081 0.014
(1.017) (2.431) (1.790) (0.566)
7 days (-3,3)   0.044 0.054*   0.058   0.010
(1.046) (1.883) (1.068) (0.326)
9 days (-4,4)   0.029 0.055*   0.035 0.007
(0.601) (1.672) (0.571) (0.209)
11 days (-5,5)   0.003 0.069*   0.022 0.013
(0.062) (1.893) (0.319) (0.327)
Panel C: Confirmations of SDIL rates on 8th March 2017
1 day (0,0)   0.014   0.008   0.005 0.036***
(1.360) (0.563) (0.306) (3.856)
3 days (-1,1)   0.008 0.005 0.015 0.057***
(0.478) (0.204) (0.499) (3.469)
5 days (-2,2)   0.002 0.002 0.016 0.074***
(0.079) (0.057) (0.404) (3.467)
7 days (-3,3) 0.018   0.001 0.035 0.033
(0.647) (0.029) (0.760) (1.270)
Note: The estimates are obtained using stock price data from -125 day to -6 trading
day before the initial SDIL announcement on 16th March 2016. They are robust to
the case when the data period is extended to 250 trading days before the event
window. Test statistics on normal returns of non-soft drink stocks are available
upon request.
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(Continued)
Event window A. G. Barr Plc Britvic Plc Fever-Tree Drinks Plc Nichols Plc
9 days (-4,4) 0.042 0.003 0.018 0.048
(1.341) (0.061) (0.347) (1.638)
11 days (-5,5) 0.068* 0.003 0.021 0.064*
(1.963) (0.039) (0.344) (1.961)
C. CARs estimated with FTSE 250 and a 250-day estimation window
Event window A. G. Barr Plc Britvic Plc Fever-Tree Drinks
Plc
Nichols Plc
Panel A: Announcement of SDIL on 16th March 2016
1 day (0,0)   0.028**   0.020**   0.016   0.071***
(2.265) (2.287) (0.683) (4.632)
3 days (-1,1)   0.079***   0.041*** 0.061   0.098***
(3.656) (2.695) (1.499) (3.584)
5 days (-2,2)   0.073**   0.025 0.108**   0.090**
(2.597) (1.264) (2.056) (2.521)
7 days (-3,3)   0.068**   0.027 0.148**   0.109**
(2.026) (1.152) (2.369) (2.562)
9 days (-4,4)   0.049   0.022 0.161**   0.112**
(1.282) (0.829) (2.270) (2.316)
11 days (-5,5)   0.038   0.007 0.163**   0.106*
(0.891) (0.233) (2.065) (1.969)
Panel B: Release of SDIL consultation report on 5th December 2016
1 day (0,0)   0.006   0.010   0.010 0.004
(0.369) (0.984) (0.423) (0.260)
3 days (-1,1)   0.004   0.030*   0.015 0.018
(0.133) (1.782) (0.377) (0.609)
5 days (-2,2)   0.030   0.056**   0.065 0.014
(0.930) (2.105) (0.616) (0.233)
7 days (-3,3)   0.038 0.055**   0.038   0.010
(0.930) (2.105) (0.616) (0.233)
9 days (-4,4)   0.027 0.051*   0.020 0.006
(0.581) (1.703) (0.275) (0.126)
11 days (-5,5)   0.007 0.059*   0.015 0.013
(0.139) (1.786) (0.190) (0.239)
Panel C: Confirmations of SDIL rates on 8th March 2017
1 day (0,0)   0.015   0.009   0.008 0.036***
(1.063) (0.774) (0.409) (2.990)
3 days (-1,1)   0.007 0.004 0.009 0.058***
(0.275) (0.175) (0.240) (2.726)
5 days (-2,2)   0.002 0.000 0.005 0.075***
(0.056) (0.010) (0.111) (2.747)
7 days (-3,3) 0.019   0.001 0.025 0.035
(0.501) (0.025) (0.447) (1.053)
9 days (-4,4) 0.049 0.007 0.010 0.051
(1.143) (0.187) (0.161) (1.349)
11 days (-5,5) 0.066 0.010 0.013 0.067
(1.388) (0.266) (0.194) (1.611)
D. Market reaction to the Implementation of SDIL on 6th April 2018
The SDIL came into effect on 6th April 2018. As it was announced
by the UK government in advance, the implementation of SDIL on
this day was not an unexpected shock to the market and therefore
would not have caused changes in the stock market value of the
soft drink firms. This absence of stock market response is
confirmed in the Table D1 below which showed that the CARs
to the SDIL implementationwas not statistically significant for any
firms regardless of the length of event window used.
E. Robustness checks of the cross-sectional analysis
SDIL
announcement
on
16th March 2016
Release of
consultation report
on
5th December 2016
Confirmation of
SDIL rates on
8th March 2017
1 day
(0,0)
3 days
(-1,1)
1 day
(0,0)
3 days
(-1,1)
1 day
(0,0)
3 days
(-1,1)
Panel A: CARs estimated with FTSE All Share Index and a 120-day estimation
window as dependent variable
Soft drinks   0.042***   0.043   0.007*   0.010 0.003 0.013
(0.013) (0.035) (0.004) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014)
Firm size   0.004***   0.001   0.000 0.002 0.001   0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
Constant 0.095*** 0.038 0.003   0.038   0.019 0.020
(0.032) (0.034) (0.016) (0.073) (0.018) (0.092)
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30
R-squared 0.423 0.128 0.052 0.020 0.029 0.022
Panel B: CARs estimatedwith FTSE 250 Index and a 250-day estimationwindow
as dependent variable
Soft drinks   0.043***   0.046   0.007*   0.009 0.003 0.015
(0.013) (0.033) (0.004) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015)
Firm size   0.004***   0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001   0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
Constant 0.091*** 0.029 0.001   0.045   0.018 0.024
(0.031) (0.035) (0.017) (0.070) (0.017) (0.091)
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30
R-squared 0.428 0.146 0.051 0.025 0.025 0.032
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